Correcting the Force Structure Mismatch

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OUR CURRENT National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS) and existing Army force structure bode ill for the future of the Army. As a result of the *Bottom-Up Review* (*BUR*), the Army was right-sized and structured to meet the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars (MTWs). However, this force structure was never intended to support current deployment levels for military operations other than war (MOOTW). In fact, the *BUR* warned that, "protracted commitments to peace operations could lower the overall readiness of US active duty forces over time, and in turn, reduce our ability to fulfill our strategy to be able to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts."[1]

Increased MOOTW deployments such as Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia have driven the Army's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) to historically high levels. As prophesied by the *BUR*, the Army's overall readiness is declining. Moreover, given our current NSS, a turbulent international community ripe with MOOTW opportunities and continuing fiscal pressures, it is unlikely the Army can expect a reduction to OPTEMPO in the near future. In short, the Army is faced with a strategy and force structure mismatch.

To compound this mismatch, the Army faces another pressing problem in its responsibilities to support joint warfighting. As joint warfighting doctrine continues to evolve and improve, deficiencies concerning critical missions such as rear area protection of the joint logistics and sustainment base and the need for a war-termination force have surfaced. These uniquely Army missions pose a difficult challenge. How can the Army correct these joint warfighting deficiencies in an environment which already overtaxes its capabilities and resources?

This article suggests solving these two problems by leveraging Army National Guard (ARNG) maneuver forces. First, the Army must change its strategy paradigm that precludes early deployment of ARNG maneuver forces to remain capable of responding to two nearly simultaneous MTWs. Next, this article recommends reorganizing at least two ARNG divisions into special purpose divisions (SPDs) to address joint warfighting deficiencies. Finally, this article addresses possible criticisms and benefits of these recommended strategy and force structure solutions.

The Army's overall readiness is declining. Moreover, given our current National Security Strategy, a turbulent international community ripe with opportunities for military operations other than war and continuing fiscal pressures, it is unlikely the Army can expect a reduction to OPTEMPO in the near future. In short, the Army is faced with a strategy and force structure mismatch.

Changing the Paradigm

Late in the Cold War, the Army's strategy for using its Reserve Component (RC) forces was totally different from today's. Born of the joint vision of General Creighton Abrams and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the Total Force concept was embraced by an Army all too aware of the problems created by not using significant RC forces in either the Korean or Vietnam Wars. Without a draft and facing overwhelming Soviet ground combat power in Europe, the Army fully integrated its RC forces, including ARNG maneuver elements, for early deployment. Through initiatives such as round-out brigades, the Army merged RC maneuver units into its combat divisions. Moreover, through the extremely successful CAPSTONE Program, RC units

were linked to active component (AC) Army commands for early deployment and full integration into a Total Army. Extensive equipment modernization accompanied these focused RC missions, and greatly improved RC training and readiness for deployment throughout the 1980s.

General H. Norman Schwartzkopf commander of US Forces in Operations *Desert Shield* and *Storm* expressed his confidence in ARNG maneuver elements in 1985, "Round-out is a fact of life. . . . The 48th Brigade, Georgia Army National Guard, is the third brigade of my division . . . expect them to fight alongside us. They have demonstrated (their capability) through three demanding rotations at the National Training Center. . . . They are, in fact, combat ready."[2]

RC units cannot attain the readiness levels of comparable AC units in 39 days of yearly premobilization training. Therefore, some degree of risk will always be associated with early deployment of RC units. The key question is: how much risk is acceptable? If the risk of deploying ARNG maneuver units early is within acceptable limits, the Army could benefit greatly.

Later, Schwartzkopf would receive no Guard maneuver elements as part of the forces employed to defeat Saddam Hussein. What had changed? Had ARNG maneuver readiness degraded so much in five years?

The answer has been a contentious debate topic for the past decade. For all the reports and statistics the active Army unearthed to support the ARNG maneuver unit's lack of readiness in 1990, the Guard community has provided equal evidence to counter the arguments.

As a result of this readiness furor, the Army no longer plans to use ARNG maneuver units early in future conflicts. The 15 ARNG enhanced brigades are not planned for deployment until 90 days into any future conflict. The remaining ARNG divisions have been shelved as a strategic hedge with no real relevance. It is time to abandon the conflict between the active Army and ARNG over Guard readiness and look at ARNG maneuver unit utility from a new perspective.

The search for a new paradigm properly begins by considering the connection between readiness and risks. RC units cannot attain the readiness levels of equivalent AC units in 39 days of yearly premobilization training. Therefore, some degree of risk will always be associated with early deployment of RC units. The key question is: how much risk is acceptable? If the risk of deploying ARNG maneuver units early is within acceptable limits, the Army could benefit greatly.

The Bartlett Model for strategy and force planning (Figure 1) can help clarify the concept of risk.[3] More specifically, the Bartlett Model can help compare the risks of deploying RC maneuver units early during the Cold War to risks with their early deployment in today's strategic environment.

During the latter stages of the Cold War the Army's security challenges centered on halting and defeating a massive Soviet offensive into Central Europe. The Army intended to deploy RC maneuver and support forces very early at the C3 readiness level.[4] The decision to deploy C3 units meant that the Army was accepting some degree of tactical risk that units could not perform some of the missions for which they were organized. Even during the defense build-up in the mid-80s, the Army maintained its strategy of early deployment of RC maneuver forces. In a security environment of high threat and increasing resources, the Army was willing to accept the tactical risks associated with deploying C3 RC units.

Today, the Army faces no peer competitor such as the massive Soviet Army, just a small group of ill-trained, ill-equipped regional armies.[5] Further, Army and joint capabilities for precision deep attack of enemy forces have revolutionized the ground combat concept of battle space. No longer must the enemy be reduced in a desperate fight by maneuver elements along the forward line of troops (FLOT). Enemy maneuver units can now be reduced by deadly surface and air joint operational fires many miles from the FLOT. Although resource constraints have reduced the active Army's relative maneuver combat power by nearly half since the

Figure 1

During *REFORGER '85*, the 947th Medical Company (Colorado Army National Guard) drew, exercised and returned POMCUS equipment—and shipped its own vehicles from and to CONUS.

US Army

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Cold War, the Army remains the world's premier ground-combat force.

Yet with risks to maneuver forces greatly reduced, the Army is unwilling to accept the greatly reduced tactical risk of deploying C3 RC maneuver forces. Today, the Army illogically demands that RC maneuver units attain a C1 readiness level prior to deployment. By so doing, the Army disregards reduced tactical risks to maneuver forces on future battlefields resulting from quantum improvements in long-range precision weapons and joint capabilities.

Evidence supports a change in the Army's strategy for using its RC maneuver forces. Even though the Army has incorporated RC combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units into war plans early, the Army still finds itself under significant stress due to increased MOOTW deployments. AC maneuver units deployed extensively to perform MOOTW missions have their warfighting readiness degraded. The Army would struggle to respond to two nearly simultaneous MTWs if a division or larger portion of its maneuver forces were engaged in a MOOTW deployment. It would have been very difficult for the Army to have withdrawn the division from Bosnia for redeployment to either Saudi Arabia or Korea.

The Army could resolve this current mismatch between strategy and force structure by including ARNG maneuver forces for earlier deployment. By deploying Guard enhanced brigades at C2 or C3, sufficient ground combat power would be available to prevent the commanders in chief from having to redeploy AC maneuver forces engaged in ongoing MOOTW missions. In the current environment of acceptable risk, we must plan for earlier deployment of the 15 ARNG enhanced brigades to meet the

Active and Reserve Component soldiers clamp down transom beams on a 100-foot Baily bridge during the train-up for the 49th Armored Divisions deployment to Bosnia, Fort Polk, Louisiana.

SFC Brenda Benner

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MOOTW tempo without jeopardizing a response to two nearly simultaneous MTWs. By further leveraging ARNG maneuver forces, the Army could address its other challenge to correct existing joint warfighting deficiencies.

Restructuring ARNG Divisions

The *BUR* describes the four phases of US combat operations—

- Phase 1: halt the invasion;
- Phase 2: build up US combat power in the theater while reducing the enemy's;
- Phase 3: decisively defeat the enemy; and
- Phase 4: provide for post-war stability.[6]

Current joint warfighting doctrine fully supports phases 1 and 2 of US combat operations. However, deficiencies have been identified in phases 3 and 4. In phase 3, as available combat forces deploy forward for attack or counterattack, logistics and critical joint sustainment facilities in the rear area are left vulnerable. A 1995 *Congressional Research Study Report* captures the essence of this deficiency, "Joint doctrine presently directs Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces to fend for themselves, using assets deployed for other purposes, but potential threats to ports, airfields, logistic installations and command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I) facilities make that provision seem imprudent."[7] Failure to correct this security problem could prove costly to joint forces in a future MTW. Loss of joint force lines of communication could cause premature operational or strategic culmination and failed offensive operations.



Figure 2.

The *BUR* addressed the doctrinal and practical need for war-termination forces during phase 4, "Finally, a smaller complement of joint forces would remain in the theater once the enemy had been defeated. These forces might include a carrier battle group, one to two wings of fighters, a division or less of ground forces and special operations units."[8] US joint warfare in Operations *Just Cause* and *Desert Storm* validated the role of stay-behind war-termination forces to protect the peace. Doctrinally, what kind of ground force is needed in phases 3 and 4?

One solution to these joint doctrinal deficiencies leverages ARNG divisions. As a result of the *BUR*, ARNG divisions are seen as excess to the need to win two nearly simultaneous MTWs. However, because of the off-site agreement, these eight divisions remain in the ARNG to provide force structure to support agreed-upon end-strength for the Guard.[9] Recently, the Army decided that two ARNG divisions would be reorganized into CSS units to correct Army logistics and sustainment force structure shortfalls. The remaining six divisions are not considered in existing war plans and are viewed as a strategic hedge against a re-emergent Russian threat. Because of the remote chance of a reemergent Russian threat, two divisions could be reorganized into special purpose divisions (SPD) to correct the joint war-fighting deficiencies in phases 3 and 4 of future MTWs.

By deploying Guard enhanced brigades at C2 or C3, sufficient ground combat power would be available to prevent the commanders in chief from having to redeploy AC maneuver forces engaged in ongoing MOOTW missions. In the current environment of acceptable risk, we must plan for earlier deployment of the 15 ARNG enhanced brigades to meet the MOOTW tempo without jeopardizing a response to two nearly simultaneous MTWs.

The proposed SPD structure differs considerably from current Army and ARNG divisions (See Figure 2). The maneuver arm of the SPD is less than one-third the size of current Army divisions; the artillery and aviation force structure is reduced; division general support forces, called "division troops," have been downsized; and the division support command is reduced by one forward support battalion. However, engineer and military police capabilities have been greatly increased compared to current divisions. This proposed SPD organizational structure is about 25 percent (over 4,000 troops) smaller than the current Army and ARNG mechanized divisions. The substantial savings in troops and greatly reduced maneuver training costs could capitalize the added military police and

engineer forces and fund retraining costs associated with reorganization. Therefore, reorganization of the divisions should not result in increased costs.[10]

Functions During Phases 3 and 4

To explain employment of the SPD to correct joint warfighting deficiencies, phases 3 and 4 of a future MTW will be discussed, beginning with phase 3. The *BUR* describes operations during phase 3 as, "large scale, air-land counteroffensive to defeat the enemy decisively by attacking his centers of gravity, retaking territory he has occupied, destroying his war-making capabilities and successfully achieving other operational or strategic objectives."[11]

As available combat forces deploy forward for attack or counterattack, logistics and critical joint sustainment facilities in the rear area are left vulnerable. A 1995 Congressional report captures the essence of this deficiency, "Joint doctrine presently directs Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces to fend for themselves, using assets deployed for other purposes, but potential threats to ports, airfields, logistic installations and C³I facilities make that provision seem imprudent."

This phase of a conflict would likely entail threats to the joint force rear area of up to company-sized, bypassed enemy elements operating against logistics sites, communications facilities, rail networks, critical roads, ports and airfields. Enemy special operating forces and saboteurs would continue to operate, as they likely did in phases 1 and 2, against critical joint force rear facilities. Attacks on facilities and transportation networks could be expected from enemy ballistic missiles armed with conventional and possibly chemical warheads.

The SPD has unique capabilities to counter these threats. SPD engineer forces are robust enough to repair damaged facilities, critical roads and rail networks. With the combat power of the maneuver, aviation and field artillery brigades, a significant tactical combat force (TCF) is available to repel multiple company- or battalion-sized enemy threats. The artillery brigade can detect and neutralize enemy short and medium indirect fires at critical rear-area facilities. The Patriot battery can provide ballistic missile defense for the most critical rear facilities. The military police brigade has sufficient forces to secure transportation networks and provide robust point security for critical facilities such as ports, airfields and C³I sites. The composite combat/prisoner of war battalion in the military police brigade facilitates the rearward movement and security of enemy prisoners of war as joint forces continue to attack.

The SPD could also be used in smaller scale contingencies (SCC) to protect joint force rear areas. Organizing the SPD into brigade-sized packages complies with the current joint force doctrine of adaptive packaging. Only those operating functions (in battalion-sized increments) needed to support the critical joint rear area protection mission would be mobilized and deployed in support of SCCs.

The SPD, organized into brigade-sized units, facilitates training at the brigade and battalion level. RC units so organized have historically demonstrated the ability to achieve readiness level C1 in 60 to 90 days and C2 just 30 days after mobilization. Because the SPD would primarily be employed at the battalion/battalion task force level when performing operational missions, risks associated with synchronizing complex brigade- and higher-level missions are avoided. In essence, the SPD would focus primarily on battalion-level defensive missions while securing the joint force rear area. The SPD headquarters is far more capable and robust to perform command and control of rear area security forces than is now being accomplished by Army rear area operation centers.

In Operations *Desert Shield* and *Storm*, an SPD could have been ready for deployment by 90 to 120 days before the start of what the *BUR* envisioned as phase 3. In a future MTW, SPDs could easily be ready for deployment by the time strategic air- and sealift become available after having deployed phase 1 and 2 forces. The SPD's organizational structure, position on the battlefield at the close of phase 3 operations and limited exposure to high-intensity combat operations, make it the best choice as a stay-behind war-termination force in phase 4 of a future conflict.

Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, summarizes both the requirement for a post-hostilities force and the need for a smooth transition from conflict to post-conflict operations: "Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that conflict termination is an essential link between national

A squad from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment works its way through a threatening crowd in the simulated town of Zvornik at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The exercise was part of the 3d ACR and 49th Armored Division predeployment training for Bosnia.

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Units employed along the FLOT in modern high-intensity offensive operations are battle-hardened warriors accustomed to combat ROE. The MOOTW mission of peace enforcement requires strict ROE and measured responses. Recent research surrounding this dichotomy illuminates the difficulty maneuver forces have transitioning from combat to peacekeeping.

security strategy (NSS), NMS and post-hostility aims—the desired end state."[12]

What kind of ground force is needed in the post-conflict phase of an MTW? The current plan, elucidated by the *BUR*, calls for ground forces employed in the counterattack during phase 3 to be retained in theater to perform this critical mission. However, there are several reasons why this is not prudent.

First, maneuver forces and their associated support elements will have been used in high-intensity combat operations. Units employed along the FLOT in modern high-intensity offensive operations are battle-hardened warriors accustomed to combat rules of engagement (ROE). The MOOTW mission of peace enforcement requires strict ROE and measured responses. Recent research surrounding this dichotomy illuminates the difficulty maneuver forces have transitioning from combat to peacekeeping: "Recent training events and recent operations show that our service members may be able to shift from peace operations to mid-intensity combat, but that going from a combat mindset to a peacekeeping one, without some retraining, is exceptionally difficult. In fact, it is so difficult, that whenever possible, the same force should not be used sequentially for combat and peacekeeping operations."[13]

The SPD, having not been employed along the FLOT during phase 3, will not have operated under permissive ROE. There would be little difference in the threat intensity and ROE used by the majority of the SPD in phase 3, and what can be expected in phase 4 of a US joint force operation.

The second problem with using traditionally organized brigades of divisions as stay-behind forces involves functional capabilities. Missions required in phase 4 revolve around repairing damaged infrastructure and performing police and law enforcement functions until civil capabilities can be restored. Some capability will be needed to conduct small-scale combat operations in response to organized rogue elements not willing to abide by the peace or cease-fire. Traditionally organized maneuver forces, while long on combat capabilities, are woefully short on engineer and military police capabilities needed for phase 4. The SPD is specially

organized with the right kind of forces to perform missions most needed.

The last reason for using the SPD instead of phase 3 stay-behind forces involves strategic flexibility. By employing the SPD, phase 3 ground combat forces can redeploy and reconstitute much sooner. Therefore, the Army could more quickly respond to another MTW, SCC or MOOTW mission.

Recently, the Army decided that two ARNG divisions would be reorganized into CSS units to correct Army logistics and sustainment force structure shortfalls. The remaining six are not considered in existing war plans and are viewed as a strategic hedge against the remote chance of a reemergent Russian threat. Two of these could be reorganized into special purpose divisions to correct the joint warfighting deficiencies in future MTWs.

The SPD provides a cost-effective, flexible, low-risk solution to correcting phase 3 and 4 joint warfighting deficiencies. Indeed, it lowers our current level of strategic risk. Moreover, the organizational structure of the ARNG SPD improves existing Guard capabilities to perform disaster-response and homeland defense missions for our state governors. The reorganized ARNG SPDs add value to the security of both our nation and our states.

Criticism of the SPD

Based on current strategy, the Army argues that we cannot afford to accept the risk of deploying ARNG maneuver forces at less than Cl readiness levels. The response to this argument focuses on the concept of risk. Increasing MOOTWA deployments could eventually leave the Army with insufficient maneuver forces with which to respond to two nearly simultaneous MTWs—a huge *strategic* risk. However, by deploying ARNG maneuver forces early at the C2 or C3 readiness level, the assumed risk is *tactical*. Faced with few or no alternatives, the military wisely assumes tactical level risks to prevent strategic shortfalls.

Some might argue that ARNG force structure should be cut to free the resources to standup two AC divisions to solve the Army's OPTEMPO and joint warfighting deficiencies. However, considering the costs of maintaining ARNG forces (about 25 percent of a comparable AC unit) massive ARNG force structure cuts would be needed (over 100,000 troops) to stand up two AC divisions. Such a drastic ARNG force reduction would drive ARNG force structure far below current historically low levels. State governors and local communities would not tolerate such a large ARNG force reduction. Political support for ARNG force structure cuts to stand up even one more AC division is improbable. Because strategy and force structure decisions must be reconciled with domestic political reality, further ARNG force structure cuts necessary to solve the Army's problems are not realistic.

Critics could also argue that the SPD is too radical a departure from traditional Army divisional structure. But consider the structure of our current Army divisions. Of the ten active Army divisions, only three are structured alike. Seven of the divisions are structured to perform seven different special purpose missions. Granted, each division is structured to perform offensive and defensive operations equally well. However, the SPD could still be structured to perform predominately the defensive operations required of phases 3 and 4 of a MTW/SCC. As joint doctrine evolves, services must alter traditional mind-sets and embrace specialized functions, organizations and missions.

Benefits of the SPD Concept

The strategy and force structure solutions in this article leverage available forces to answer today's challenges while positioning for tomorrow's opportunities. These solutions answer contemporary challenges by providing both a low-risk strategy and cost-effective RC maneuver force structure that allows the Army to continue accomplishing NSS-driven MOOTW deployments while providing sufficient forces for two nearly simultaneous MTWs. The SPDs position the Army for tomorrow's opportunities by providing alternatives with which the Army can, if required, further reduce active maneuver forces to capitalize research, development and acquisition for the Army's transformation.

The strategy and force structure solutions in this article also provide a stimulus for the Army to further embrace joint warfighting doctrine. This article recommends an alternative strategy and force structure that allows the Army to mirror the extremely successful adaptive packaging methodology used by the US Marine Corps to support joint warfighting.

Lastly, by leveraging ARNG maneuver forces,

the Army avoids the sunk costs of failing to exploit current ARNG leadership. Billions of dollars have been spent improving ARNG leadership in the past two decades. The current senior and mid-level ARNG leaders are the beneficiaries of massive spending to improve technical and tactical proficiency. Moreover, the infusion of AC soldiers into the ARNG as a result of AC reductions in the past decade has helped improve ARNG unit proficiency. The Army has a current window of opportunity to take advantage of these ARNG improvements to correct today's challenges, capitalize the next Army and lay the framework for the objective force.

Even though our current NSS and NMS bode ill for the Army, it need not be so. The Army's current strategy and force structure mismatch is a by-product of both our current NSS and the post-*BUR* force structure choices made by senior Army leaders. Embedded in those force structure choices is a strategy dramatically changed from the Cold War years. As a result of the current strategy for using RC maneuver forces, over half the ground combat power of the Army is effectively beyond the effective reach of Army and joint planners laboring to resolve the current strategy and force structure mismatch.

This article offers an alternative that allows decision makers to reconsider the relationship between readiness and risks associated with early deployment of RC maneuver forces in today's security environment. The tactical risk of deploying RC maneuver forces early can forestall the greater strategic risk of having insufficient forces for response to two nearly simultaneous MTWs. Moreover, by tapping the unused potential of ARNG divisions, the kind of forces needed to correct our joint warfighting deficiencies are within reach.

The special purpose divisions provide a cost-effective, flexible, low-risk solution to correcting phase 3 and 4 joint warfighting deficiencies. Indeed, it lowers our current level of strategic risk. Moreover, the organizational structure of the ARNG SPD improves existing Guard capabilities to perform disaster-response and homeland defense missions for our state governors. The reorganized ARNG SPDs add value to the security of both our nation and our states.

By leveraging ARNG maneuver forces, the Army can have sufficient forces to continue MOOTW deployments, respond to two nearly simultaneous MTWs, improve our homeland defense response capabilities and correct the Army's joint warfighting deficiencies. ***MR***

NOTES

1. US Department of Defense (DOD) Report, *Report of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOD, 1 September 1993), 94.
2. Stephen L. Goff and Ralph E. Kahlan, "The Roundout Program: Is it Still Valid?" Unpublished Research Paper, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1990), 8.
3. Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, "The Art and Strategy of Force Planning," in *Strategy and Force Planning* ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1995), 17.
4. US Army readiness reporting criteria states that units at C2 readiness can perform all missions with fewer than 42 days of post-mobilization training. C2 readiness equates to fewer than 28 days of training for full proficiency. CI readiness assumes full proficiency with fewer than 14 days of training after mobilization.
5. The descriptors ill-trained and ill-equipped refer to the status of training and equipment of regional armies when compared to training and equipment of US Army forces, both Active and Reserve.
6. US DOD Report, *BUR*, 15-16.
7. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, *Military Roles and Missions: A Framework for Review*, (Washington, D.C.: The Library of Congress, 1995), 62.
8. US DOD Report, *BUR*, 17.
9. In 1993 an agreement between the Department of the Army, US Army Reserve and Army National Guard established end-strength floors for the ARNG and USAR. Additionally, this Off-Site Agreement put the majority of Army RC CSS structure in the USAR and nearly all RC CS and combat units in the ARNG.
10. A comprehensive cost analysis of reorganizing ARNG mechanized/heavy divisions into SPDs is beyond the scope of this paper. However, preliminary analysis using National Guard Bureau Resource Management Model costing procedures indicates a savings of between 16 and 18 million dollars associated with the annual cost of training and maintaining an ARNG mechanized division as opposed to the proposed DPD. These substantial savings estimates, along with using existing ARNG engineer forces, reorganized ARNG maneuver forces, and existing military police forces suggest the SPD concept could be implemented with minimal or no National Guard Bureau budget increase.
11. US DOD Report, *BUR*, 16.
12. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chairman, JCS, 1995), 1-9.
13. Winn Noyes, "Peacekeepers and War Fighters: Same Force, Different Mindset", Unpublished Research Paper (US Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1995), 8-9.

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